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Cooperative	 banks	 are	 small	 credit	 institutions,	 and	 they	 are	more	 likely	 than	 commercial	
banks	 to	 default	 in	 periods	 of	 financial	 stability.	 Focusing	 on	 Italy	 (one	 of	 the	 largest	
cooperative	banking	markets),	we	analyse	the	contribution	of	efficiency	to	the	estimation	of	
the	 probability	 of	 default	 of	 cooperative	 banks.	 We	 estimate	 several	 measures	 of	 bank	
efficiency,	 and	 we	 run	 a	 discrete‐time	 survival	 model	 to	 determine	 whether	 different	
managerial	 abilities	 play	 different	 roles	 in	 predicting	 bank	 failures.	 We	 show	 that	 higher	























banks	were	 a	 driving	 force	 for	 socially	 committed	 business	 at	 the	 local	 level	 through	 their	
3,900	member	banks,	65,000	branches,	more	than	770,000	employees,	50	million	members,	
and	 180	 million	 clients	 (European	 Association	 of	 Co‐operative	 Banks,	 2011).	 Overall,	
cooperative	 banks	 account	 for	 approximately	 one	 fifth	 of	 the	 European	 banking	 system	
(market	 shares	 of	 deposits	 and	 credits	 are	 21%	 and	 19%,	 respectively).	 Various	 studies	
(Groeneveld	 and	 de	 Vries,	 2009;	 Cihák	 and	 Hesse,	 2007;	 Groeneveld,	 2012)	 suggest	 that	
cooperative	banks	are,	on	average,	more	stable	 than	commercial	banks	because	they	have	a	
great	 deal	 of	 soft	 information	 (which	 is	 hard	 to	 collect)	 on	 the	 creditworthiness	 of	
members/customers,	 and	 therefore	 they	 are	 much	 less	 likely	 to	 make	 lending	 mistakes.	
However,	in	times	of	financial	stability,	regulators	are	more	prone	to	let	a	distressed	bank	go	
into	default	if	it	is	a	small	cooperative	bank.	This	outcome	is	consistent	with	the	Too‐Big‐To‐
Fail	 policy	 (i.e.,	 regulators	 avoid	 letting	 the	 largest	 and	 most	 powerful	 banks	 go	 out	 of	
business	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 panic	 in	 financial	 markets)	 and	 the	 Too‐Important‐To‐Fail	
argument	 (i.e.,	 regulators	 avoid	 letting	 the	 most	 well‐known	 and	 systematically	 important	
banks	 go	 out	 of	 business	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 the	 risk	 that	 many	 banks	 fail	 together).	 For	
instance,	the	default	rate	of	Italian	cooperative	banks	was	almost	four	times	higher	than	that	
of	commercial	banks	in	the	period	before	the	financial	crisis	(1997–2006).	Specifically,	there	
were	 44	 default	 cases	 among	 cooperative	 banks	 (default	 rate	 1.04%)	 and	 8	 among	
commercial	banks	(default	rate	0.28%).	
Our	paper	analyses	the	determinants	of	the	probability	of	survival	of	cooperative	banks.	





there	 is	 evidence	 that	higher	 efficiency	 reduces	bank	 risk‐taking	 (e.g.,	Berger	 and	DeYoung,	
1997;	Fiordelisi	et	al.,	2011;	Cihák	and	Schaeck,	2013),	we	posit	that	a	lower	exposure	to	risky	
assets	 increases	 the	 survival	 time	 of	 a	 bank.	 Consequently,	we	 argue	 that	 higher	 efficiency	
favours	bank	soundness.	Surprisingly,	there	is	limited	available	empirical	evidence	supporting	
this	 expectation.	As	 such,	we	posit	 that	bank	 survival	 is	 related	 to	 the	managerial	 ability	 to	
















Italian	 cooperative	 banks1	have	 approximately	 36,000	 employees,	 6.7	 million	 clients,	 1.1	
million	members2,	and	7.3%	of	the	market	share	of	deposits3.	Second,	the	Italian	cooperative	
banking	 sector	 is	 the	 fourth	 largest	 in	Europe	after	Germany,	France,	 and	Austria	 (in	 2010,	
6.7%4	of	the	total	assets	under	management	in	the	EU	27	cooperative	banking	sector).	Finally,	
Italy	presents	 a	useful	 laboratory	 setting	 to	 analyse	 the	 impact	 of	 the	economic,	 social,	 and	
demographic	 conditions	 of	 local	 areas	 on	 bank	 efficiency.	 The	 Italian	 regions	 display	 very	
different	conditions	that	must	be	considered	to	accurately	estimate	the	probability	of	failure.	
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows:	Section	2	briefly	reviews	the	relevant	
literature.	 In	 Section	 3,	 we	 formulate	 our	 research	 hypotheses	 and	 describe	 the	 data	
employed	in	the	empirical	analysis.	Section	4	summarizes	the	methodology.	Section	5	reports	




Our	 paper	 joins	 two	 separate	 streams	 of	 the	 economic	 literature.	 The	 first	 stream	
concerns	efficiency	estimation	with	the	aim	of	comparing	cooperative	and	commercial	banks.	
One	 group	 of	 studies	 compares	 cooperative	 and	 commercial	 banks	 by	 estimating,	 first,	 a	
specific	 efficiency	 frontier	 for	 each	 type	of	 bank	 and,	 second,	 a	 common	 frontier	 that	 pools	
together	cooperative	and	commercial	banks.	These	papers	provide	mixed	evidence	about	the	
																																																													









also	 occurs	 when	 estimates	 are	 obtained	 from	 a	 single	 efficient	 frontier	 estimated	 for	
cooperative	banks	only.	Cooperative	banks	have	a	strong	 link	with	 the	geographical	area	 in	
which	 they	 operate;	 therefore,	 the	 levels	 of	 efficiency	 are	 influenced	 by	 the	 social,	
demographic,	and	economic	conditions	of	that	specific	area.		
Various	 papers	 also	 compare	 commercial	 and	 cooperative	 banks	 by	 focusing	 on	 issues	




lower	volatility	of	 the	cooperative	banks’	 returns	more	 than	offsets	 their	 lower	profitability	
and	capitalization.	Groeneveld	(2012)	compares	commercial	and	cooperative	banks,	focusing	
on	the	mean	values	of	some	indicators	(return	on	equity,	Tier	1	capital,	and	Z‐score).	Overall,	
the	 author	 concludes	 that	 in	 Europe	 cooperative	 banks	 are	 less	 profitable	 and	more	 stable	
than	commercial	banks.		
The	 second	 stream	 of	 literature	 addresses	 the	 estimation	 of	 bank	 failures	 and	 is	
characterized	by	two	approaches:	micro‐	and	macro‐approaches.	The	“micro”	strand	focuses	
on	 individual	 banks’	 balance	 sheet	 data,	 possibly	 integrated	 with	 financial	 market	 data,	 to	
predict	 bank	 failures.	 This	 approach	 stems	 from	 the	 seminal	 papers	 of	 Altman	 (1968)	 and	
Beaver	(1966),	who	use	accounting	data	to	discriminate	between	sound	and	troubled	 firms.	
Since	then,	many	studies	have	assessed	 the	ability	of	 financial	 ratios	 to	predict	 the	 financial	






Hasan	 (2010)	 reviewed	 this	 extensive	 literature	 and	 showed	 that	 the	 combination	 of	




The	 “macro”	 approach	 investigates	 banking	 crises	 by	 focusing	 on	 macroeconomic	
determinants	(Demirguc‐Kunt	and	Detragiache,	1998;	González‐Hermosillo,	1999;	Davis	and	
Karim,	2008b).	These	studies	typically	analyse	a	large	sample	of	countries	to	determine	which	
macroeconomic	 factors	 signal	a	banking	crisis	 in	advance.	For	 instance,	Demirguc‐Kunt	and	
Detragiache	 (1998)	 argue	 that	 GDP	 growth,	 excessively	 high	 real	 interest	 rates,	 and	 high	
inflation	significantly	increase	the	likelihood	of	systemic	banking	crises.	Other	recent	studies	
(DeYoung,	2003;	Arena,	2008;	Männasoo	and	Mayes,	2009;	Mare,	2012)	have	used	both	the	
micro	 and	macro	perspectives,	 highlighting	 that	 combining	different	 sources	of	 information	
increases	the	accuracy	of	predictions	of	bank	financial	distress.		
Various	papers	have	estimated	the	probability	of	bank	failure	or	survival.	Lane	et	al.	(1986)	
pioneered	 the	 field	 by	 using	 duration	 analysis.	 The	 authors	 were	 the	 first	 to	 use	 the	 Cox	
proportional	 hazards	 model	 to	 predict	 US	 commercial	 bank	 failures.	 Estrella	 et	 al.	 (2000)	
estimate	 the	 likelihood	 of	 failure	 using	 cross‐sectional	 logit	 regressions	 and	 then	 analyse	
time‐dependency	 in	 the	 conditional	 probability	 of	 failure	 through	 a	 proportional	 hazards	







Shumway	 (2001)	 develops	 a	 discrete‐time	 hazard	 model	 to	 determine	 probability	




cross‐sectional	 logit	 estimation	 and	 survival	 time	 analysis	 to	 prove	 that	 bank‐level	
fundamentals,	 the	 banking	 system,	 and	 macroeconomic	 variables	 significantly	 affect	 the	
likelihood	 of	 bank	 failures	 in	 the	 case	 of	 banking	 crises	 in	 East	 Asia	 and	 Latin	 America.	 In	
addition,	the	author	suggests	that	systemic	macroeconomic	and	liquidity	shocks	destabilized	
not	only	the	banks	that	were	already	weak	before	the	crises,	but	also	those	banks	that	were	
relatively	 stronger	 ex‐ante.	 This	 result	 suggests	 that	 negative	 effects	 triggered	 by	 systemic	
crises	can	also	affect	sound	banks.	Männasoo	and	Mayes	(2009)	use	a	discrete	complementary	
log‐log	 model	 to	 link	 banks’	 hazard	 rates	 to	 macroeconomic,	 structural,	 and	 bank‐specific	
factors.	The	study	suggests	that	changes	 in	bank	earnings,	efficiency	(measured	by	the	cost‐
income	ratio),	and	the	relative	size	of	the	credit	portfolio	are	not	early	warning	indicators.		
Although	 various	 studies	 (e.g.,	 Berger	 and	DeYoung,	 1997;	 Fiordelisi	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Cihák	
and	Schaeck,	2013)	have	analysed	 the	relationship	between	bank	efficiency	and	risk‐taking,	
no	studies	have	directly	related	different	managerial	skills	to	the	occurrence	of	bank	failure.	




The	 recent	 crises	 of	 credit	 institutions	 have	 shown	 the	 importance	 of	 assessing	 how	 well	
management	contributes	to	bank	survival	(in	terms	of	minimizing	costs,	maximizing	revenues,	
or	 maximizing	 various	 measures	 of	 profits).	 The	 accurate	 prediction	 of	 bank	 survival	 is	
fundamental	for	practitioners,	investors,	academics,	and	regulators.	Whilst	this	is	true	for	all	






ability	 of	 a	 bank	 to	 reduce	 costs	 and/or	 increase	 revenues	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 avoiding	 bank	
default.	 Our	 approach	 entails	 an	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 link	 between	 various	 efficiency	
measures	 and	 the	 probability	 of	 default	 of	 cooperative	 banks.	 Moreover,	 we	 estimate	 four	
different	 efficiency	measures	 using	 stochastic	 frontier	 analysis	 and	 test	 our	 results	 using	 a	
balance‐sheet	 measure	 of	 operating	 efficiency	 (i.e.,	 cost‐income	 ratio,	 as	 in	 Männasoo	 and	
Mayes,	2009).	We	specify	three	hypotheses	that	focus	on	various	efficiency	concepts.	
First,	we	posit	that	 if	a	bank	is	more	cost	efficient	than	its	competitors,	 it	 is	 less	likely	to	
default.	The	underlying	assumption	is	that	if	bank	managers	have	superior	skills	in	managing	
costs	and	inducing	higher	cost	efficiency,	this	will	help	the	bank	survive	during	individual	or	











Alternative	Hypothesis	 I	 (H1A):	 if	 a	 bank	 is	more	 cost	 efficient	 than	 its	 competitors,	 it	 has	 an	
increased	probability	of	default	(“cost‐skimping”	hypothesis).	
	
Second,	we	 argue	 that	 if	 a	 bank	 is	more	 revenue	 efficient	 than	 its	 competitors,	 it	 has	 a	
lower	likelihood	of	default.	The	underlying	assumption	is	that	if	bank	managers	have	superior	
skills	 in	managing	revenue	and	stimulating	higher	revenue	efficiency,	this	will	help	the	bank	
survive	 in	 cases	 of	 individual	 or	 sector	 distress.	 We	 name	 this	 assumption	 “revenue‐
management	excellence”.	A	competing	hypothesis	 is	 “short‐term	revenue”:	 if	 a	bank	 is	more	
revenue	efficient	than	its	competitors,	it	has	a	higher	likelihood	of	default.	The	underlying	idea	
is	that	revenue‐efficient	banks	probably	have	a	lower	quality	loan	portfolio,	and	customers	are	
therefore	 willing	 to	 pay	 higher	 interest	 rates.	 This	 implies	 a	 trade‐off	 between	 short‐term	
revenue	efficiency	and	future	bank‐soundness.		
	








manage	either	 its	costs	or	revenues,	but	also	 to	 its	ability	 to	concurrently	manage	costs	and	
revenues	 to	 achieve	 higher	 profits.	 Specifically,	 a	 cost‐efficient	 bank	 could	 be	 disastrous	 at	
managing	 revenue	 or	 the	 reverse.	 We	 posit	 that	 if	 a	 bank	 is	 more	 profit	 efficient	 than	 its	
















Our	 sample	 comprises	 more	 than	 4,200	 observations	 and	 includes	 the	 financial	






The	data	set	 for	 the	explanatory	variables	 is	comprehensive,	 combining	bank‐level	data,	
geographical	 information,	 and	 efficiency	 measures.	 Market	 information	 is	 not	 considered	
because	cooperative	banks	are	not	publicly	traded	and	have	very	little	market	activity.	
We	 collect	 data	 from	 various	 sources.	 Data	 on	 distressed	 banks	 are	 retrieved	 from	 the	
Italian	Central	Bank	(Bank	of	Italy);	accounting	data	are	obtained	from	the	Italian	Association	
of	 Cooperative	Banks	 (Federcasse);	 and	we	 garner	 local	 geographical	 information	 from	 the	
Italian	 National	 Institute	 of	 Statistics	 (ISTAT).	 	 The	 bank‐level	 data,	 a	 potential	 leading	
indicator	 of	 failure,	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 banks’	 financial	 statements.	 Data	 are	 publicly	
available	 for	most	key	 items	 ‐	 liquidity,	balance	 sheets,	profits	and	 losses,	 off‐balance	 sheet	





Following	Männasoo	 and	Mayes	 (2009),	 we	 estimate	 a	 discrete‐time	 survival	 model	 to	
determine	the	probability	of	failure	at	each	point	in	time.	We	run	a	two‐stage	analysis.	First,	a	
complementary	 log‐log	 model	 (cloglog)	 is	 estimated	 using	 various	 efficiency	 measures,	






We	 estimate	 the	 survival	 model	 in	 discrete	 time	 because	 our	 data	 set	 only	 provides	
observations	discretely.	We	focus	on	a	single‐state	model,	and	we	assume	that	we	have	single‐
spell	data	for	each	bank.	Our	model	 implicitly	assumes	that	all	relevant	differences	between	
banks	 can	 be	 summarized	 by	 the	 observed	 explanatory	 variables.	 We	 also	 assume	 that	
bankruptcy	only	occurs	at	discrete	points	in	time	(t=	1,	2,	3,...,	n).	Moreover,	each	bank	either	
fails	 during	 the	 sample	 period	 or	 survives.	 If	 banks	 merge	 or	 are	 liquidated	 or	 if	 the	
identification	 variable	 (Abi)	 is	 not	 available	 for	 the	 whole	 observation	 window,	 they	 are	
omitted	from	the	sample.	Thus,	we	consider	exits	from	a	single	state	(soundness)	to	a	single	
destination	(failure).		
The	 random	 variable	 T	 denotes	 the	 time	 to	 exit	 from	 the	 sample	 (failure)	 and	 t	 the	
realization	thereof.	The	discrete‐time	duration	model	implies	that	we	observe	the	probability	
of	survival	of	cooperative	banks	at	distinct	points	in	time.	Because	the	sample	data	refer	to	an	
observation	window	of	 ten	years,	 the	survival	 time	data	 set	 is	 right‐censored,	meaning	 that	
we	observe	the	start	date	of	the	spell	(year	1996)	but	not	the	total	length	of	transition	out	of	





function	of	T	at	duration	time	 j	(failure	function);	and	S(aj)	 is	the	survival	function	at	time	 j.	
The	discrete	hazard	rate	is	the	conditional	probability	of	exit	in	the	interval	(aj‐1,	aj]	defined	as:	











we	 summarize	 this	 information	 in	 a	 vector	 of	 variables.	 Time‐varying	 covariates	 offer	 an	
opportunity	to	dynamically	examine	the	relationship	between	the	distress	probability	and	the	
changing	 conditions	under	which	 the	distress	 takes	place.	The	hazard	 rate	 and	 the	 selected	
characteristics	are	linked	through	an	index	function.	Following	Männasoo	and	Mayes	(2009),	
we	employ	a	complementary	log‐log	model	(cloglog):	
( , ) 1 exp[ exp( ' ' ' )]j j j j jh j         X EF CAL ENV 	 (	4	)
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
where	 	contains	 time‐varying	 covariates;	 ,	 ,	 and	 are	 the	 vectors	 of	 coefficients;	
	denotes	 efficiency	 measures;	 jCAL captures	 bank‐level	 fundamentals;	
represents	 environmental	 variables;	 and	 	is	 the	 log	 of	 the	 difference	 between	 the	
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Following	 previous	 studies	 (Arena,	 2008;	 Männasoo	 and	 Mayes,	 2009,	 among	 others),	
bank	 default	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 occurrence	 of	 public	 intervention	 to	 solve	 a	 critical	 distress	
situation.	We	model	bank	failures	using	a	categorical	variable	that	equals	1	if	bank	i	failed	at	
time	t	and	equals	0	otherwise.	Following	Italian	law,	we	define	a	bank	as	being	in	default	if	it	
underwent	 either	 of	 the	 two	 following	 events	 between	 January	 1,	 1997	 and	 December	 31,	












failure	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 better	 management	 of	 bank	 operations	 quantified	 by	 the	
efficiency	measures.		
First,	we	estimate	cost	efficiency	by	using	Battese	and	Coelli’s	(1995)	stochastic	frontier	model,	
as	detailed	 in	Appendix	1.	We	also	 compute	 the	 cost‐to‐income	 ratio	 as	 a	direct	 test	 to	measure	
	 
14
efficiency	 in	 generating	 operating	 income.	We	 then	 include	 other	 variables	 that	 are	 likely	 to	





specifically,	 we	 measure	 Capital	 Adequacy	 as	 the	 ratio	 between	 the	 capital	 in	 excess	 of	
regulatory	 requirements	 and	 the	 minimum	 capital	 requirement;	 we	 estimate	 bank	 Asset	
Quality	 using	 the	 ratio	 of	 annual	 loan	 loss	 provisions	 to	 total	 loans	 and	 we	 quantify	 the	
Liquidity	Risk	as	the	ratio	of	bank	deposits	to	customer	deposits.	The	two	remaining	CAMEL	
categories	(i.e.,	Management	Quality	and	Earnings)	are	explicitly	included	in	the	estimation	of	






The	 descriptive	 statistics	 for	 the	 explanatory	 variables	 are	 reported	 in	 Table	 3.	 We	
separate	all	banks	 into	 two	categories:	 failed	and	non‐failed	banks.	T‐tests	are	computed	to	
detect	statistically	significant	differences	in	univariate	comparisons.		
																																																													
5	CAMEL	 is	 the	 acronym	 referring	 to	 the	 following	 five	 factors	 introduced	by	US	 regulators	 in	November	1979:	 “C”	 stands	 for	










(2009),	 the	 explanatory	variables	 are	 lagged	by	one	year.	 The	discrete‐time	 survival	model	
relates	 a	 change	 in	 the	 hazard	 rate	 due	 to	 an	 absolute	 change	 in	 a	 given	 regressor,	 ceteris	
paribus.	The	characteristics	of	the	economic	environment	(at	both	the	local	and	national	level)	
and	bank‐specific	 indicators	 are	 introduced	 to	 the	 analysis	 to	 control	 for	 factors	 that	 could	
influence	the	link	between	bank	efficiency	and	the	probability	of	default.	The	control	variables	





To	 test	 our	 research	 hypotheses,	 we	 run	 our	 cloglog	 model	 (Equation	 4)	 using	 five	
different	specifications	to	link	efficiency	and	bank	failure	(respectively,	one	for	each	efficiency	
measure	and	one	using	the	cost‐to‐income	ratio).	






In	 regard	 to	a	bank’s	 ability	 to	maximize	 its	 revenues,	 our	 results	 support	 the	 revenue‐





Turning	 to	 profits,	 our	 findings	 support	 the	 management‐excellence	 hypothesis	 (H3)	
because	more	profit–efficient	banks	are	found	to	have	a	higher	probability	of	survival.	We	use	




as	 banks	 that	 are	 less	 able	 to	 contain	 their	 operating	 costs	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 poorly	
managed	and	show	a	higher	hazard	rate.	
	We	find	that	 the	CAMEL	indicators	are	statistically	significant	(at	the	10%	level	or	 less)	
and	 strongly	 related	 to	 the	 hazard	 rate.	 Specifically,	 higher	 capital	 levels	 reduce	 the	
probability	 of	 default.	 This	 supports	 the	 view	 that	 higher	 capitalization	 provides	 additional	
loss	absorbency	and	reduces	a	bank’s	moral	hazard	(Lane	et	al.,	1986;	Fiordelisi	et	al.,	2011;	
Haq	and	Heaney,	2012,	among	many	others).	As	such,	strengthening	the	capital	requirement	
in	 the	 cooperative	 banking	 sector,	 as	 proposed	 in	 the	 Basel	 III	 agreement6,	 may	 help	 to	
prevent	bank	distress.	
																																																													




We	also	note	 that	asset	quality	 (measured	by	 the	 loan	 loss	provision	 ratio)	 is	positively	
related	(at	the	1%	level)	to	the	probability	of	default.	As	such,	in	the	case	of	a	decrease	in	asset	
quality	(i.e.,	the	loan	loss	provision	ratio	increases),	the	probability	of	default	for	cooperative	
banks	 increases.	 In	 line	with	Männasoo	and	Mayes	(2009),	we	find	that	the	 liquidity	ratio	 is	
positively	 and	 statistically	 significantly	 related	 to	 the	 probability	 of	 default.	 This	 result	
suggests	 that	 when	 cooperative	 banks	 rely	 too	 heavily	 on	 the	 interbank	 market,	 they	 are	
exposed	 to	 the	 sudden	 freezing	 of	 funds.	 This	 can	 lead	 banks	 to	 default,	 especially	 during	







fits	 the	 observed	 phenomena7.	 We	 again	 run	 the	 five	 models	 in	 Table	 4	 using	 only	 the	
variables	 that	were	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 10%	 level;	 therefore,	we	 do	 not	 consider	
employment	 growth	 in	 our	 computations.	 In	 Model	 5	 of	 Table	 4,	 we	 include	 the	 cost‐to‐
																																																																																																																																																																																									
the	 publication	 of	 the	 first	 accord	 on	 capital	 measurement	 and	 capital	 standards	 (Basel	 I,	 July	 1988)	 and	 a	 second,	 more	
comprehensive	framework	(Basel	II,	June	2004).	
7	As	 a	 further	 test,	 we	 run	 a	 robustness	 check	 by	 comparing	 the	 impact	 of	 efficiency	 on	 the	 probability	 of	 bank	 default	 in	
cooperative	and	commercial	banking.	We	 retrieve	accounting	data	on	 Italian	commercial	banks	 from	 the	Bankscope	database.	
Because	data	on	defaults	for	commercial	banks	are	insufficient	to	estimate	a	model	(8	defaults	over	the	period	1997–2006),	we	








5,	 we	 report	 six	 indicators:	 Sensitivity,	 Specificity,	 Overall	 Predictive	 Power,	 ROC	 Area,	




Sensitivity	 quantifies	 the	 proportion	 of	 banks	 in	 default	 that	 are	 correctly	 identified	 as	
such;	 Specificity	 measures	 the	 proportion	 of	 safe	 banks	 (e.g.,	 sound)	 that	 are	 correctly	
identified.	These	two	indicators	are	closely	related	to	the	concepts	of	Type	I	and	Type	II	errors:	
all	 estimated	 models	 have	 an	 in‐sample	 Sensitivity	 higher	 than	 54%	 (70%,	 if	 we	 do	 not	
consider	 Estimation	5,	which	has	 the	 lowest	performance)	 and	Specificity	higher	 than	75%	
(80%,	 if	we	 omit	 Estimation	 5,	which	 has	 the	 lowest	 performance),	 values	 that	 are	 largely	
superior	 to	 those	 of	 a	 naïve	 model	 (i.e.,	 50%).	 The	 Overall	 Predictive	 Power	 is	 the	 ratio	
between	the	sum	of	all	safe	and	defaulted	banks	accurately	classified	and	the	total	number	of	
banks.	All	estimations	have	in‐sample	Overall	Predictive	Power	higher	than	74%	(80%,	if	we	
omit	 Specification	 5,	which	 has	 the	 lowest	 performance,	 and	 83%	 in	 the	 best	 specification,	
which	 includes	operating	 cost	 efficiency),	 a	 figure	 that	 is	 largely	 superior	 to	 that	 of	 a	naïve	
model	(i.e.,	50%).	





the	higher	 the	 likelihood	that	an	actual	default	 case	will	be	assigned	a	higher	probability	of	
being	 in	 default	 than	 an	 actual	 sound	 case.	 All	 estimations	 have	 an	 in‐sample	 Overall	
Predictive	 Power	 higher	 than	 76%	 (83%	 if	 we	 omit	 Specification	 5,	 which	 has	 the	 lowest	




where	 	is	 the	estimated	default	probability	of	 the	banks	(from	1	to	n),	and	 is	 the	actual	




Overall,	 the	 specifications	 (especially	 Specification	 1,	 which	 includes	 cost	 efficiency)	





We	 also	 run	 an	 out‐of‐sample	 test	 by	 estimating	 hazard	 rates	 using	 the	 estimated	
coefficients	 and	 data	 from	 2009.	 This	 enables	 us	 to	 validate	 our	 results	 by	 tackling	 the	














we	 observe	 only	 six	 default	 cases	 in	 2009	 (and	 no	 defaults	 in	 2007	 and	 2008).	 Not	








cooperative	 banks.	 Cooperative	 banks	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 European	 banking	 industry.	
Despite	 their	 importance,	 these	 banks	 experience	 financial	 distress	 more	 frequently	 than	
commercial	banks	during	periods	of	financial	stability.	The	default	rate	of	Italian	cooperative	
banks	 was	 almost	 four	 times	 that	 of	 commercial	 banks	 in	 the	 period	 before	 the	 recent	
financial	 crisis	 (1997–2006).	 Specifically,	 there	 were	 44	 default	 cases	 among	 cooperative	
banks	(default	rate	1.04%)	and	8	among	commercial	banks	(default	rate	0.28%).		
Our	paper	analyses	the	determinants	of	the	probability	of	survival	of	cooperative	banks	by	
focusing	on	 the	 role	 of	 efficiency.	Our	 results	 indicate	 that	 lower	 risk	 is	 related	 to	 a	 higher	
survival	 time	 for	cooperative	banks.	These	 findings	contribute	 to	 the	existing	 literature	that	
investigates	 the	 direct	 link	 between	 efficiency	 and	 risk‐taking	 (Chortareas	 et	 al.,	 2011;	












Our	 findings	 are	 of	 interest	 for	 policy	makers	 and	 supervisors.	 Recent	 developments	 in	
banking	 regulations	 stem	 from	 the	 idea	 that	 efficiency	 is	 a	 key	 element	 in	 assessing	 the	
relationship	 between	 bank	 risk	 and	 capital	 levels.	 There	 is	 a	 parallel	 between	 Basel	 II	
prescriptions	 regarding	 internal	 control	 processes	 and	higher	 efficiency	 gains	 because	both	
contribute	to	an	increase	in	the	resilience	of	banks.	Similarly,	the	new	corporate	governance	
directives	for	banks	support	the	cost,	revenue,	and	excellent‐management	hypotheses,	in	line	
with	 the	 results	 of	 the	 paper.	 Moreover,	 we	 show	 that	 higher	 capital	 levels	 reduce	 the	
probability	of	default:	this	supports	the	view	that	higher	capital	levels	provide	additional	loss	
absorbency	 and	 reduce	 a	 bank’s	moral	 hazard.	 As	 such,	 in	 the	 cooperative	 banking	 sector,	
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The	 set	 of	 potential	 explanatory	 variables	 is	 chosen	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 the	
probability	 of	 failure	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 better	 management	 of	 bank	 operations	
quantified	by	the	efficiency	measures.	Cost	efficiency	is	measured	using	stochastic	frontier	
analysis	 and	 the	 Battese	 and	 Coelli	 (1995)	 stochastic	 frontier	model.	We	 use	 the	 following	
translog	functional	form:	
	 (6)	
where	 TC	 is	 the	 logarithm	 of	 the	 total	 production	 cost;	 yi	 (i=1,	 2,	 3,	 4)	 are	 output	
quantities;	 Pj	 (j=1,	 2,	 3)	 are	 input	 prices;	 ln	 E	 is	 the	 natural	 logarithm	 of	 total	 equity	
capital;	and	T	is	the	time	trend	to	account	for	possible	changes	in	technology	during	the	





	 Italian	 cooperative	 banks	 constitute	 a	 heterogeneous	 dataset.	 To	 overcome	 this	
problem	 and	 take	 into	 consideration	 local	 market	 conditions,	 we	 adopt	 the	 technical	
inefficiency	effects	model	proposed	by	Battese	and	Coelli	(1995).	Following	Battaglia	et	
LnTC  a0  bi lnYi 
i1
4 c j lnPj 
j1













3 lnYi lnPj  i lnYi ln E 
i1
4 i lnYiT 
i1
4  j lnPj ln E 
j1











To	 obtain	 a	 complete	 view	 of	 the	 performance	 of	 cooperative	 banks,	 we	 also	
estimate	 revenue‐	 and	 profit‐efficiency	 measures,	 which	 specify	 various	 measures	 of	
profits	(respectively,	total	revenue,	and	operating	income	and	interest	margin)	given	the	
level	of	outputs	rather	than	the	output	prices.	The	frontier	definition	is	the	same	as	in	the	





8	Our	 frontier	model	 includes	environmental	variables	that	are	estimated	at	 the	regional	 level	 (for	each	of	 the	20	Italian	
































1997	 405	 1	 3	 4	 0.99%	 291	 ‐	 2	 2	 0.69%	
1998	 404	 1	 5	 6	 1.49%	 299	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.00%	
1999	 414	 ‐	 4	 4	 0.97%	 288	 1	 1	 2	 0.69%	
2000	 432	 ‐	 5	 5	 1.16%	 284	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.35%	
2001	 436	 ‐	 5	 5	 1.15%	 296	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.00%	
2002	 436	 ‐	 6	 6	 1.38%	 293	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.34%	
2003	 430	 1	 6	 7	 1.63%	 282	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.35%	
2004	 434	 ‐	 2	 2	 0.46%	 279	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.36%	
2005	 424	 ‐	 4	 4	 0.94%	 279	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.00%	
2006	 432	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.23%	 283	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.00%	
Pre‐Crisis	Period	
(1997‐2006)	 4,247	 3	 41	 44	 1.04%	 2,874	 1	 7	 8	 0.28%	
2007	 431	 ‐	 ‐	 0	 0.00%	 234	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.00%	
2008	 431	 ‐	 ‐	 0	 0.00%	 255	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.39%	
2009	 421	 1	 5	 6	 1.43%	 285	 ‐	 6	 6	 1.75%	
Crisis	Period	
(2007‐2009)	 1,283	 1	 5	 6	 0.47%	 774	 0	 7	 7	 0.90%	
Overall	Period






































		 All	 Non‐Failed	 Failed	 T‐test	for	Means	
Variables	 Mean	 S.E.	 Mean	 S.E.	 Mean	 S.E.	 Difference	 t‐statistic
Cost	
Efficiency		 0.630	 0.269	 0.632	 0.269 0.487 0.210	 	 0.144	 3.543***
Revenue	
Efficiency	 0.630	 0.263	 0.629	 0.263 0.702 0.268	 	 ‐0.073	 ‐1.843*
Operating	
Efficiency		 0.611	 0.271	 0.614	 0.269 0.329 0.231	 	 0.284	 6.978***
Interest	
Efficiency	 0.729	 0.242	 0.731	 0.241 0.542 0.230	 	 0.189	 5.172***
Cost‐Income	 0.780	 0.127	 0.779	 0.123 0.900 0.310	 	 ‐0.122	 ‐6.380***
Capital	
Adequacy	 2.631	 2.230	 2.629	 2.223 2.768 2.851	 	 ‐0.139	 ‐0.4107
Credit	
Orientation	 0.642	 0.122	 0.641	 0.122 0.716 0.128	 	 ‐0.075	 ‐4.038***
Asset	
Quality	 0.003	 0.005	 0.003	 0.005 0.010 0.011	 	 ‐0.007	 ‐9.083***
Liquidity	 0.026	 0.045	 0.026	 0.044 0.031 0.059	 	 ‐0.005	 ‐0.779
Size	 11.663	 0.983	 11.675	 0.971 10.490 1.324	 	 1.185	 8.016***
Employment	
Growth	 0.021	 0.020	 ‐	 ‐	 	 ‐	 ‐	 	 ‐	 ‐	












Variables	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Cost	 ‐4.34***	 		 		 		 		
(1.017)	 		 		 		
Revenue	 ‐1.643*	 		 		
(0.927)	 		 		
Operating		 		 		 ‐3.559***	 		
		 		 (0.962)	 		
Interest	 		 		 ‐1.959***	
		 		 (0.662)	
Cost‐Income	 		 		 		 0.060	
		 		 		 (0.051)	
Capital	Adequacy	 ‐0.752***	 ‐0.548***	 ‐0.493**	 ‐0.524***	 ‐0.653***	
(0.202)	 (0.203)	 (0.195)	 (0.191)	 (0.225)	
Credit	Orientation	 0.896***	 0.472**	 0.425**	 0.501***	 0.623***	
(0.164)	 (0.207)	 (0.178)	 (0.178)	 (0.166)	
Asset	Quality	 0.453***	 0.583***	 0.489***	 0.497***	 0.544***	
(0.076)	 (0.08)	 (0.077)	 (0.077)	 (0.073)	
Liquidity	 0.322***	 0.254**	 0.357***	 0.323***	 0.249**	
(0.102)	 (0.105)	 (0.095)	 (0.099)	 (0.106)	
Size	 ‐0.678***	 ‐1.082***	 ‐0.728***	 ‐0.85***	 ‐0.949***	
(0.208)	 (0.17)	 (0.167)	 (0.164)	 (0.183)	
Employment	
Growth	 ‐0.311	 9.325	 2.743	 4.064	 6.631	
(8.224)	 (8.59)	 (7.78)	 (7.913)	 (8.398)	
GDP	Growth	 ‐0.484***	 ‐0.531***	 ‐0.451***	 ‐0.534***	 ‐0.738***	
		 (0.098)	 (0.164)	 (0.094)	 (0.103)	 (0.08)	
Observations	 4215	 4215	 4215	 4215	 4215	
Number	of	Failures	 44	 44	 44	 44	 44	












1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Sensitivity	 0.795	 0.705	 0.773	 0.750	 0.545	
Specificity	 0.833	 0.801	 0.814	 0.813	 0.748	
Overall	
Predictive	 	 0.832	 0.800	 0.813	 0.812	 0.745	
ROC	Area	 0.879	 0.832	 0.866	 0.845	 0.765	
Accuracy	Ratio	 0.757	 0.664	 0.733	 0.689	 0.531	







1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
1‐5	 0.068	 0.136	 0.045	 0.114	 0.091	
6	 0.023	 0.000	 0.023	 0.000	 0.114	
7	 0.023	 0.068	 0.023	 0.068	 0.136	
8	 0.091	 0.091	 0.068	 0.068	 0.159	
9	 0.114	 0.091	 0.091	 0.182	 0.136	












1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Sensitivity	 0.500	 0.167	 0.167	 0.167	 0.000	
Specificity	 0.793	 0.894	 0.878	 0.749	 0.998	
Overall	
Predictive	 	 0.789	 0.884	 0.868	 0.741	 0.984	
ROC	Area	 0.715	 0.657	 0.680	 0.567	 0.626	
Accuracy	Ratio	 0.430	 0.313	 0.359	 0.134	 0.252	









1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
1‐5	 0.167	 0.167	 0.333	 0.500	 0.333	
6	 0.167	 0.333	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
7	 0.000	 0.167	 0.000	 0.333	 0.167	
8	 0.167	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.333	
9	 0.167	 0.167	 0.500	 0.000	 0.000	











	 Centre	 North	East	 North	West	 South	 Total	
Z1	 Population	 density	 (number	 of	 inhabitants	 per	
square	kilometre)	(A)	 194.00 132.74 337.80 214.53	 192.17
Z2	Index	 of	 concentration	 in	 the	 territory,	 (percentage	
ratio	 between	 people	 resident	 in	 the	 main	 city	 of	 the	
region	and	those	resident	in	the	towns)	(A)	
64.76 33.22 32.24 33.77	 39.13
Z3	Gross	domestic	product	per	head	(A)	 24.75 27.73 28.81 15.18	 24.20
Z4	Entrepreneurial	liveliness	(ratio	of	the	net	number	of	
incorporations	in	the	Registrar	of	Companies)	(A)	 2.11 1.77 1.79 2.82	 2.10
Z5	 Incidence	 of	 nonperforming	 loans	 (incidence	 of	
precarious	 loans,	 overdue	 bills,	 groundings,	 and	
restructured	 loans	on	 the	 total	amount	of	bank	assets)	
(B)	
7.90 6.50 5.77 16.43	 9.13
Z6	 Number	 of	 cash	 points	 (ATM	 and	 POS)	 owned	 by	
cooperative	banks	over	the	total	existing	in	the	territory	
(B)		
10.23 19.13 6.52 6.05	 12.52
Z7	 Number	 of	 bank	 branches	 owned	 by	 cooperative	
banks	over	the	total	existing	in	the	territory	(B)		 9.66 37.80 8.58 9.12	 21.47
Z8	Number	of	ATM	and	POS	(owned	by	cooperatives	and	
other	banks)	per	1,000	inhabitants	(B)		 18.45 25.51 15.50 8.63	 18.65
Z9	 Number	 of	 branches	 (owned	 by	 cooperatives	 and	
other	banks)	per	1,000	inhabitants	(B)	 0.58 0.85 0.62 0.32	 0.64
Z10	 Index	 of	 firm	 weakness	 (number	 of	 bankruptcies	
declared	per	1,000	firms)	(A)	 2.97 1.75 2.53 2.66	 2.31
Z11	Level	 of	 criminality	(number	 of	 bank	 robberies	 per	
1,000	branches)	(C)		 77.06 41.40 93.44 91.45	 67.52
Z12	 Index	 of	 solidarity	 (number	 of	 blood	 donors	 per	
1,000	inhabitants)	(D)	 0.22 0.35 0.34 0.12	 0.27
(A)	Source	of	data:	ISTAT	(Italian	National	Institute	of	Statistics)	
(B)	Source	of	data:	Statistical	Bulletins	attached	to	the	magazine	Cooperazione	di	Credito	
(C)	Source	of	data:	Ministero	dell’Interno	(Ministry	of	Home	Affairs)	
(D)	Source	of	data:	AVIS	(Italian	Association	of	Blood	Donors)	
	
